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Review of Polger & Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book 
(2016, OUP) 
Reviewed by Umut Baysan 
When fish propel their bodies under water in order to travel from one place to another, are 
they doing the same kind of thing that we do when we swim? If swimming is to be identified 
with exactly the kind of thing that we do when we swim, we should seriously consider the 
following question: Do fish swim? Believe it or not, how you think about these questions 
bears relevance to what you will make of this book’s central arguments against the multiple 
realization thesis in philosophy of mind. As Polger and Shapiro report, the conventional 
wisdom in philosophy of mind is that psychological kinds are multiply realized (and if not, 
they are multiply realizable) by different physical kinds; therefore we shouldn’t expect to 
find identities between psychological kinds and physical kinds. Polger and Shapiro oppose 
exactly this conventional wisdom and use their opposition to support what they take to be a 
modest version of identity theory: ‘important mental state kinds are characterised with the 
proprietary resources of the neurosciences’ (25). In so doing, they turn questions about 
multiple realization into questions of the sort that I asked about fish and swimming. 
Polger and Shapiro suggest that ‘the question of multiple realization is a question about actual 
sciences, and it is always specific and contrastive’ (64). So, instead of asking if a kind K is 
multiply realized, we should ask if K, as construed by a science S1, is multiply realized by 
kinds K1 and K2, as construed by a science S2. According to the revisionary treatment of 
multiple realization given in the book – ‘the official recipe’ (67) as the authors call it – the 
question of whether a psychological state M is multiply realized in, say, human beings and 
otters by different neurophysiological states is turned into four sub-questions. First, is M 
really a state that a human being and an otter can be in as far as psychological taxonomy is 
concerned? Second, are neurophysiological realizers of M in human beings and otters really 
different as far as neurophysiological taxonomy is concerned? Third, are these 
neurophysiological kinds in question different from each other in a relevant sense so that 
their variation makes a difference as to how M is brought about? Fourth, supposing that a 
human being’s instantiation of M and an otter’s instantiation of M can be somewhat different 
– despite both being instances of M – is the variation between these instances distinct from 
the variation between their realizers? If (and only if) these four questions are answered 
affirmatively, we can say that M is multiply realized in human beings and otters by different 
neurophysiological kinds. That is the central claim of the book at any rate.  
By offering an original recipe of multiple realization as such, Polger and Shapiro carry out an 
impressive task in debunking nearly all well-known (and also some less known) putative 
examples of multiple realization. Neural plasticity and evolutionary convergence on 
psychological similarity through different physiological solutions are sometimes cited as 
actual examples of multiple realization. By giving a clear and instructive account of what 
these phenomena are, Polger and Shapiro argue that neither neural plasticity (90-98) nor 
evolutionary convergence (136-146) can give us genuine multiple realization. Other clearly 
presented and very interesting case studies they cover include: face recognition in honeybees 
(47-50), an uncommon anatomic condition known as ‘situs inversus’ (86-87), ferrets whose 
brains are ‘rewired’ (92-98), electric fish that try to avoid ‘jamming’ each other (117), so on 
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and so forth. If you are interested in the issue of multiple realization and lack scientific 
examples for illustrative purposes, this should be your reference book – despite the authors’ 
arguments that we shouldn’t think of these as cases of multiple realization. For even if you 
are not persuaded by their official recipe, you can easily help yourself to some of these really 
fancy examples. 
Roughly, the book’s dialectic is as follows. First, the authors construe functionalism as the 
view that all psychological kinds are multiply realized or realizable. This renders all non-
reductive physicalist views as functionalist, although Polger and Shapiro think that this is 
acceptable because they understand the notion of ‘function’ very broadly, thereby don’t 
commit non-reductive physicalism to any specific brand of functionalism (12, 22-23, and 
elsewhere). Then they contrast functionalism with the identity theory, which, according to 
their understanding, holds that there are some identities between psychological kinds and 
neurophysiological kinds (25, 35, 51, 130, and elsewhere). By analysing multiple realization 
in their own distinctive way (67 onwards), they argue that nearly all putative cases of 
multiple realization fail to satisfy their criteria, as illustrated above. They claim that paucity 
of actual multiple realization supports the identity theory, not functionalism. They then ably 
respond to objections that their view implies a form of eliminativism (Ch. 9) and suffers from 
an explanatory exclusion problem (Ch. 10). They end the book with a revisionary sketch of 
how different sciences relate to one another (216-219). 
Despite being beautifully written and being beset with very nice and clearly presented 
examples, the book failed to persuade me about some of the essential points in the 
aforementioned dialectic. First, we aren’t really given an argument that multiple realizability 
(i.e. the possibility of multiple realization) is not an option for the considered psychological 
kinds. On this point, the authors are rather dismissive about their opponents’ metaphysical 
intuitions. They are right that ‘the best evidence for the multiple realizability of psychological 
states is their actual multiple realization’ (52; see also 80), but surely this is hardly any news. 
It is a truism that actuality of something entails its possibility. Apart from actual instances, 
what could support the possibility of something? Polger and Shapiro don’t offer an answer to 
this question. Instead they make some very uncontroversial statements, such as: ‘in the 
absence of evidence of actual multiple realization, we should be very cautious indeed about 
insisting that mental states are nevertheless multiply realizable’ (53; see also 57). This makes 
it rather difficult to evaluate their case against the multiple realizability of psychological 
kinds and also some of their claims including the one that the ‘possibility of evidence is not 
evidence of a possibility’ (147). They say that they don’t endorse ‘as a general principle that 
absence of evidence is evidence of absence’ (53, fn 11); however, I am not persuaded that 
they actually abide by this non-endorsement, especially when they take the absence of actual 
multiple realization to support the identity theory. 
Second, there is a sense in which Polger and Shapiro are changing the rules of the game when 
they dismiss metaphysical possibilities as relevant for identity claims. For example, they 
employ (51) Ned Block’s ‘Disney Principle’, which originally states that ‘laws of nature 
impose constraints on ways of making something that satisfies a certain description’.1 
Although Polger and Shapiro omit Block’s mention of ‘laws of nature’, I believe that they 
convey Block’s idea well (51, see also 140). If the Disney Principle is true, then there are 
                                                          
1 Block, N. 1997. Anti-reductionism Slaps Back. Noûs 31:107-132. 
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certain constraints on how a functional kind can be implemented in any given nomologically 
possible world. But note that the principle is silent as to what we should expect to find in 
nomologically impossible (but metaphysically possible) worlds. And as far as the identity of 
psychological kinds and neurophysiological kinds is concerned, metaphysical possibilities 
matter. As far as I can see, the authors could say that their methodology is naturalistic so they 
are not interested in metaphysical possibilities. But given that many philosophers who are 
working on these issues are indeed interested in such possibilities, I am not sure how 
satisfactory that response would be. 
Finally, Polger and Shapiro are changing the rules of the game once more when they 
formulate functionalism and the identity theory in non-standard ways. Functionalism is 
presented as a universal thesis, whereas the identity theory is presented as a modest 
existential thesis (25, 35, 51, 130, 155, and elsewhere). I have my doubts that they have a 
persuasive argument even for the modest existential thesis (for the reasons mentioned in the 
previous two paragraphs). But even if we were to be persuaded by those arguments, surely 
we can still ask: why should we agree with Polger and Shapiro that this is how we should 
carve the logical space? 
That said, this is a beautiful book and I very much enjoyed reading it. Polger and Shapiro’s 
writing is clear and engaging, and their presentation of philosophical problems and scientific 
cases is very illuminating. From the opening page, they make it clear that they see 
‘philosophy of mind as a species of philosophy of science’ (3), and the result is a very nice 
and empirically informed philosophy of science book. 
